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The First World War saw a dramatic increase in the involvement of civilians in
the conﬂict, the introduction of new ways of managing people and populations,
and a recasting of the relationship between the individual and the state. It also
profoundly reshaped the rights of noncitizens. In particular, it called into ques-
tion their right to move freely and to enjoy protection under international law,
heightened their vulnerability, and increased their exposure to policies of dis-
crimination, expulsion, deportation, internment, and forced migration.
Expulsion of migrants and their transformation into illegal aliens had already
emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century as crucial tools in the state-
driven redeﬁnition of inclusion and exclusion.1 The war and the Russian Rev-
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olution radicalized the processes of exclusion that were already underway, but
they went further by reshaping subjecthood and citizenship, giving them new
meanings and boundaries, making it more difﬁcult for individuals to be natu-
ralized and easier for them to be denaturalized and rendered stateless, broaden-
ing the gap between citizens and foreigners, and establishing new forms of con-
trol on migration movements. The war and the revolution, however, not only
triggered practices of exclusion but expanded internal citizenship as well.
The mobilization of populations and national and imperial communities fueled
expectations and promises of inclusion and anticipations of an enlargement of
the boundaries of the political community to include usually marginalized
groups like women and workers.2
And yet, these processes of inclusion proved to be effective only for some
groups and individuals within the belligerent societies. In fact, as Mark von Ha-
gen maintains, especially in multiethnic empires,
The politics of the Great War had as their consequences the narrowing of the choices
available to many communities and the raising of the stakes for choosing or having at-
tributed to them the “wrong” national identity. Within the cosmopolitan imperial elite
themselves, the wartime policies and the ways in which the war inserted into other po-
litical conﬂicts had the effect of polarization along national lines. The result of these
changes and the policies which shaped them was the politicization of ethnic differences
and the overlaying of an ethnic or national dimension to many otherwise non-national
political, economic, and social conﬂicts.3
The war, therefore, imposed markers of identity (nationality, language, religion,
ethnicity, etc.) on people, often independently of their own choices, and crys-
tallized ethnolinguistic attribution.4 Furthermore, the combination of war and
revolution made citizenship and rights heavily dependent on class, social dis-
crimination, and political factors.5 Yet throughout Europe there were millions
2 Kathleen Canning, “Sexual Crisis and the Writing of Citizenship: Reﬂections on
States of Exception in Germany, 1914–1920,” in Staats-Gewalt: Ausnahmezustand
und Sicherheitsregimes, ed. Gadi Algazi, Alf Lüdtke, and Michael Wildt (Göttingen,
2008), 167–213. On the transformative effect of war and revolution in the former Russian
Empire, see Eric Lohr, Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union (Cambridge,
MA, 2012), 128–31.
3 Mark von Hagen, “The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian
Empire,” in Post-Soviet Political Order: Conﬂict and State Building, ed. Barnett R.
Rubin and Jack L. Snyder (London, 1998), 34–57, 37.
4 Ibid. Also Gerald Stourzh, “Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria: Good In-
tentions, Evil Consequences,” in The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical
Perspective, ed. Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms (Edinburgh, 1994), 67–83.
5 Golfo Alexopoulos, “Soviet Citizenship, More or Less: Rights, Emotions, and
States of Civic Belonging,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 7,
no. 3 (2006): 487–528, 488–89.
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of people who had not perceived their nationality status as problematic until the
outbreak of the war: people who were bilingual or multilingual, who lived
transnational lives, who moved across class and social lines, who had married
outside their national groups, and whose children, especially those born in a jus
soli country such as Britain or France, were virtually dual nationals or could
embrace a citizenship different from that of their parents.6 These people either
had to take sides by giving up national ambiguity or multiple citizenship, or
they had to endure the stigma and the consequences of being part of a national
collective body constructed and crystallized by the war or of a state entity in
which obligations and rights depended heavily on political loyalty and account-
ability.
In this article I will deal with the impact of the First World War on the notion
and practice of citizenship in France, Britain, Germany, the Russian Empire, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Italy, and on the relation-
ship between these same belligerent states and the people living in their terri-
tories—both citizens and aliens. In particular, I shall focus on the ways in
which, when faced with real or supposed security threats, governments of bel-
ligerent European countries not only mobilized populations along the member/
nonmember divide but also redrew the boundaries between members and
nonmembers and redeﬁned the path to membership. The studies that have dom-
inated the debate on this issue in the last three decades have not paid much at-
tention to the role played by the war and the revolution in reshaping citizenship
laws and practices or have considered it as a side issue. In contrast, I will try to
demonstrate how bringing the war and the revolution back in is essential to over-
come the classic distinction between jus soli and jus sanguinis and the some-
times too-Manichean divide between the assimilationist model and the ethnic
one.7 Policies of exclusion, even violent exclusion, coexisted with policies of
inclusion—and it is more with exclusion that this article is concerned. Govern-
ments of warring countries adopted a mixture of not only expulsion, deportation/
repatriation, internment, and denaturalization but also naturalization and forced
incorporation, especially in occupied territories.
6 Jus soli countries are those in which the citizenship of a child is mainly determined
by the place of its birth. Jus soli is normally opposed to jus sanguinis, according to
which a child’s citizenship is determined by its parents’ citizenship. The two systems
are not mutually exclusive but may coexist.
7 On these two models, see in particular Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nation-
hood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1992). For a critique of Brubaker,
see, among others, Dieter Gosewinkel, “Citizenship in Germany and France at the Turn
of the Twentieth Century: Some New Observations on an Old Comparison,” in Citizen-
ship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. Geoff Eley and Jan
Palmowski (Stanford, CA, 2008), 27–39, and Andreas K. Fahrmeir, “Nineteenth-
Century German Citizenships: A Reconsideration,” Historical Journal 40, no. 3 (1997):
721–52.
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Subjecthood, citizenship, and nationality are ambiguous words. Their ambi-
guity is increased and affected by the historical transformation that these words
and concepts have undergone and by our contemporary vision of the meaning
and reality of these terms.8 Furthermore, the research of the last twenty years
or so has tended to expand “the study of citizenship considerably beyond the
nation-state to local publics and social protests, to the spheres of consumption
and self representation, and the formation of individual and collective subjectiv-
ities.”9 As recently noted by Patrick Weil, there are three dimensions that fre-
quently recur in the study of citizenship: the legal, the political and civic, and
the affective.10 I will focus primarily on the legal dimension, that is, “the formal
linkage of each individual” to the state (whether a nation-state or a multiethnic
empire) “independently of an individual’s sense of belonging or degree of par-
ticipation in national and patriotic institutions.”11 However, as I will try to dem-
onstrate, wartime’s mobilization of patriotism and nationalism made legal citi-
zenship requirements contingent on origins, on the one hand, thus adding an
“ethnic” dimension to citizenship, and contingent on loyalty, emotional attach-
ment, and identiﬁcation, on the other, thus creating an overlap between the af-
fective and legal dimensions.12
Legal membership in a state did not entail identical duties and obligations in
the countries considered in this article, nor identical rights. In fact, in the period
under scrutiny, “the rights side of citizenship” was weak if not nonexistent in
many countries—as in the Russian Empire13—but stronger in Britain, France,
and Germany. Duties and rights depended heavily on religion and minority sta-
tus as well as on gender and civil status. Citizenship, for example, did not have
the same meaning and consequences for Jews and Christians in the Russian Em-
pire or for Muslims and Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Nor did it have the
same meaning for men and women all over the world. But after the war broke
8 Pietro Costa,Civitas: Storia della cittadinanza in Europa (Rome, 1999–2001), vols.
3 and 4 in particular; Linda K. Kerber, “The Meanings of Citizenship,” Journal of Amer-
icanHistory 84, no. 3 (1997): 833–54; Dieter Gosewinkel, “Citizenship, Sujecthood, Na-
tionality: Concepts of Belonging in the Age of Modern Nation States,” in European Cit-
izenship: Between National Legacies and Postnational Projects, ed. Klaus Eder and
Bernhard Giesen (Oxford, 2001), 17–35.
9 Kathleen Canning, “Reﬂections on the Vocabulary of Citizenship in Twentieth-
Century Germany,” in Citizenship and National Identity, 214–301, 215–16.
10 Weil, The Sovereign Citizen, 5–6.
11 Ibid. For a similar recent approach to this issue, see also Lohr, Russian Citizenship.
12 In this article, citizenship and subjecthood (which is the term that better suits em-
pires) are treated as synonyms, while nationality, especially when used in the context of
multinational empires, indicates either “the status of belonging to a particular nation” or
“an ethnic group forming a part of one or more political nations” (Oxford English Dic-
tionary).
13 Eric Lohr, “The Ideal Citizen and Real Subject in Late Imperial Russia,” Kritika:
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 7, no. 2 (2006): 173–94, 181.
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out, nationality overshadowed both rights and citizenship. Furthermore, it pre-
supposed an exchange between the allegiance owed by the citizen to the state
and the protection owed by the sovereign to his or her subjects (especially when
abroad). Thus, establishing the rules of membership and drawing the boundaries
between those who belonged and those who did not became increasingly impor-
tant, particularly in countries that had experienced large immigration ﬂows in
the decades before the war or those in need of manpower.
This article, which is part of a larger comparative project on the treatment of
aliens and enemy aliens during the First World War,14 is divided into four sec-
tions. The ﬁrst surveys the policies adopted by belligerent European countries
against aliens, civilians of enemy nationality (enemy aliens), and citizens/subjects
of enemy origin; the second and third concentrate on how states used naturaliza-
tion and denaturalization to redeﬁne membership and redraw the boundaries of
belonging. The fourth section presents some tentative conclusions concerning
the implementation of these policies, the individual reactions to them, the impact
of the war on citizenship, and the consequences of the changes that took place
during the war and in its aftermath.
I. Aliens and Population Policies: Enemy Aliens and the State
of Emergency
The war immediately had a strong impact on the lives of civilians. Civil liber-
ties were heavily curtailed or suspended, especially for foreigners, and later in
the war for religious or national minorities and in general all groups whose loy-
alty to the state was considered difﬁcult to ascertain. Concerned with the secu-
rity of the state and its citizens and obsessed with the idea that every stranger
could be a spy or a saboteur, governments and armies sought to render harmless
all persons with personal or family ties to an enemy country, on the presump-
tion that they would necessarily be more loyal to their origins and blood than to
the country in which they worked and lived. The war thus called the rights of
foreigners and the duty of hospitality into question, reafﬁrmed in a brutal way
the rights of the sovereign state over all the people living within its boundaries,
and left to neutral powers—the United States of America (until roughly Febru-
ary 1917), Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands—the difﬁcult task of
protecting the rights of foreigners.15
14 Daniela Luigia Caglioti, “Dealing with Enemy Aliens in WWI: Security versus
Civil Liberties and Property Rights,” Italian Journal of Public Law 2, no. 2 (2011):
180–94.
15 On the rights of foreigners and the duty of hospitality, see Elihu Root, “The Basis
of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad,” American Journal of International Law 4,
no. 3 (1910): 517–28; Georg Cavallar, The Rights of Strangers: Theories of Interna-
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In the last days of July and the ﬁrst two weeks of August 1914, in almost all
the countries that took part in the First World War, governments issued decrees
and implemented measures dealing with aliens and civilians of enemy nation-
ality who at the outbreak of the war happened to be in their respective territo-
ries. The ﬁrst group affected was composed of the so-called “enemy aliens.” As
their countries entered the conﬂict, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman
and Bulgarian subjects domiciled in France, Britain, Russia, and all other coun-
tries that joined the alliance at different stages of the war were recast as danger-
ous, sometimes extremely dangerous, “enemies within,” regardless of their per-
sonal stories, feelings, ideas, loyalty, and sense of belonging. British, French,
and Russian citizens (and later of course also citizens of Japan, Italy, Romania,
Portugal, etc.) living in Germany, the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire,
and Bulgaria were accorded the same treatment in those countries. These for-
eign subjects were in some cases transient tourists, students, or seasonal work-
ers, but in most cases they had been residents of the belligerent countries for
years. Some of them were even born in the country that now considered them
enemies. Many had married a national; others had been naturalized or were in
the process of obtaining a naturalization certiﬁcate; many owned houses, land,
shares, bank accounts, or businesses; the majority had jobs or were self-employed
and spoke the local language ﬂuently.
All of the warring countries dealt with aliens and enemy aliens under the le-
gal umbrella of the state of emergency provisions.16 Between the end of July
and the ﬁrst week of August, governments (and sometimes armies) assumed
full legislative powers17 and issued orders in council or decrees that limited per-
16 On state of emergency: Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur: Von den Anfängen des
modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf (Munich,
1928), and Schmitt, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveranität
(Berlin, 1922); Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the
Modern Democracies (New York, 1963); Giorgio Agamben, Stato d’eccezione (Turin,
2003); John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, “The Law of the Exception: A Typology
of Emergency Powers,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 2, no. 2 (2004):
210–39.
17 On emergency powers in France and Britain, see Rossiter, Constitutional Dicta-
torship, 104–16 and 151–70. On France also, Pierre Renouvin, Les formes du
gouvernement de guerre (Paris, 1925), 27–32, and Fabienne Bock, Un parlementarisme
de guerre, 1914–1919 (Paris, 2002). On Austria, see Josef Redlich, Austrian War Gov-
ernment (New Haven, CT, 1929), 77, 80, and Mark Cornwall, The Undermining of
Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds (New York, 2000), 18. On Germany,
tional Hospitality, the Global Community, and Political Justice since Vitoria (Alder-
shot, 2002). On the diplomatic protection of citizens of an enemy state abroad during
a war, see Edwin M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (New
York, 1919), and William McHenry Franklin, Protection of Foreign Interests: A Study
in Diplomatic and Consular Practice (Washington, DC, 1947).
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sonal freedom, restricted or suspended civil and political liberties, and eventu-
ally curbed the economic activities of the civilians of enemy nationality and re-
strained their property rights.18
Once they had acquired emergency powers, governments strengthened their
countries’ legislation on aliens. Borders were sealed and reopened only occa-
sionally for expulsions or to exchange prisoners by way of bilateral agreements.
Foreigners, unless expelled or repatriated, could neither leave nor enter. Almost
every belligerent imposed a ban on the departure of aliens while suppressing
their freedom of movement within the country. Under these measures foreign-
ers had to register and obtain residence permits, and if they lived in operation
zones or areas considered war-sensitive they had to abandon their homes and
live in designated areas. Often they were prohibited from owning cars, bicycles,
and other means of transport or communication, and they were subjected to cur-
fews. In France, for example, the president signed a decree on August 2, 1914,
that compelled all aliens to apply for a residence permit. As a consequence, in
Paris alone, the Prefecture de Police issued 157,822 such permits; 21,500 were
temporarily granted to Germans and Austro-Hungarians. On August 15 new of-
ﬁcial instructions canceled the permits granted to enemy aliens, transforming
them into hostages. A month later, a new decree ordered that all residence per-
mits be revised and that a photograph be afﬁxed to each. Thereafter, all aliens
had to apply for authorization whenever they wanted to change domicile.19 In
the capital, the 21,500 permits granted to Germans and Austro-Hungarians at
the beginning of August were canceled, and only 245 Germans and Austro-
Hungarians and 680 French wives of Germans and Austro-Hungarians were
able to obtain documents that allowed them to stay.20 In Britain, the 1905 Aliens
18 Uğur Ümit Üngör and Eric Lohr, “Economic Nationalism, Conﬁscation, and Geno-
cide: A Comparison of the Ottoman and Russian Empires during World War I,” Journal
of Modern European History 12, no. 4 (2014): 500–22, and Daniela L. Caglioti, “Prop-
erty Rights in Time of War: Sequestration and Liquidation of Enemy Aliensʼ Assets in
Western Europe during the First World War,” ibid., 523–45.
19 Henry Maunoury, Police de guerre (1914–1919) ([Paris], 1937), 24–26.
20 Ibid., 100. Among the 245 authorized people, there were sick people stranded in
hospitals, people whose children were serving in the French army, and men serving in
the French Foreign Legion. Residence permits were instead granted to 15,000 Alsatians
and Lorrainians, 3,000 Czechs, 3,000 Poles, and 500 Italians-Slovenes (ibid., 26).
Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, The War and German Society: The Testament of a
Liberal (New Haven, CT, 1937), 108, and Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry and La-
bor in Germany, 1914–1918 (Princeton, NJ, 1966), 27–38. On the Russian Empire, Eric
Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during
World War I (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 17–20. On the Sublime Porte, Mustafa Aksakal,
The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (Cam-
bridge, 2008), 105. On Italy, Carlotta Latini,Governare l’emergenza: Delega legislativa
e pieni poteri in Italia tra Otto e Novecento (Milan, 2005), esp. 17–93.
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Act was made more stringent on August 5, 1914, when the government intro-
duced the Aliens Restriction Act, which allowed stricter control of all aliens,
not only enemy aliens. Among other provisions, it covered movements in and
out of the country, imposed compulsory registration, gave the government the
power to deport aliens, and required aliens to live in designated areas.21 Sim-
ilarly, immediately after the war declaration, the Russian Empire government
“banned the departure of enemy subjects and imposed control on their move-
ment.”22
In Germany, starting on July 31, 1914, aliens were compelled to own a pass-
port and to have it always on their person.23Britonswere required to report daily to
a police station and were subject to a curfew, while the Japanese who had not left
via Switzerland after warnings from their embassy were imprisoned.24 The Ger-
man government also suspended payments of credits and pensions to foreigners.
This provision severely affected neutral aliens, such as Spaniards, and left more
than three thousand Russian subjects without any means.25 The interior ministry
was particularly concernedwithRussianswhowere in the eastern part of the coun-
try and who could have left to avoid enlistment in their own army. All these peo-
ple, especially the many seasonal workers fromRussian Poland, had to be put un-
der special surveillance.26 The prewar policy of mandatory rotation of seasonal
workers was transformed.With the aim of meeting the country’s military and eco-
nomic needs, a ban on the departure of these Russian-Polish agricultural workers
was introduced in October 1914, and a similar ban concerning industrial workers
was issued in December 1914.27
In Austria-Hungary, a new regulation on passports and safe-conduct passes
in the war zone was issued in August 1914.28 Not only aliens but also subjects
had to apply for authorization to travel. A newly created military bureaucracy,
the Kriegsüberwachungsamt (KÜA), was entrusted with the supervision of all
requests to travel, permits to stay, changes of residence, and enemy aliens in
general.29 As far as enemy aliens were concerned, between July 30 and August 12,
21 J. C. Bird, The Control of Enemy Alien Civilians in Great Britain, 1914–1918
(New York, 1986), 14–44.
22 Lohr, Russian Citizenship, 119.
23 Reinecke, Grenzen, 226.
24 James W. Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (New York, 1917), 155.
25 Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde (hereafter BAB), R901/82912, the Spanish am-
bassador to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 9, 1914.
26 Ibid., “Über die Behandlung russischer Saisonarbeiter . . . ,” August 7, 1914.
27 Ulrich Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880–1980: Seasonal
Workers, Forced Laborers, Guest Workers (Ann Arbor, MI, 1990), 87–102.
28 Redlich, Austrian War Government, 78.
29 On the KÜA, Tamara Scheer, Die Ringstrassenfront: Österreich-Ungarn, das
Kriegsüberwachungsamt und der Ausnahmezustand während des Ersten Weltkrieges
(Vienna, 2010).
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1914, the KÜA issued numerous instructions targeting Serbians, Russians,
Montenegrins, and French, respectively. The circulars established that enemy
aliens liable to be called formilitary dutywere to be arrested and considered pris-
oners of war.30 At the same time, the ministry of foreign affairs tried to reassure
the US embassy, which was in charge of French and British diplomatic interests,
by sending a detailed memorandum on the fate of French and British subjects
within the borders of the Dual Monarchy. The document stated that women
and children were free to leave the country if they wished, while certain other
categories of people were either to be placed under special surveillance in their
places of residence, conﬁned to designated towns or areas, or interned in camps.
The majority of foreigners (French and British in particular) remained at liberty
in the ﬁrst months of the war, even though they had to report to the police. Not-
withstanding the guarantees offered by the ministry of foreign affairs, however,
people who were believed to be difﬁcult to control or “of more than doubtful
trustworthiness” were arrested and interned.31
In the Ottoman Empire, the announcement on September 9, 1914, that the
government was ready to abolish the capitulations (a special regime of privi-
leges for foreigners) accelerated the departure of foreigners.32 But when, on
October 30, the Ottomans declared war on France and Britain, “thousands
of enemy subjects were [still] living in the Ottoman Empire,”33 among them
many priests, nuns, and “Levantines.”34 In Smyrna alone there were 1,800 Bri-
30 See telegrams and circulars in Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof-, und
Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Ministerium des Äußern, Administrative Registratur, F36–582.
31 Ibid., memorandum to the American Embassy, September 5, 1914. According to
this memorandum, in Vienna, in the ﬁrst month of the war, the police arrested sixty-one
Frenchmen and eighty-seven Englishmen out of a population of 1,300 and 1,254, re-
spectively.
32 Abrogation occurred on October 1, 1914. Ahmet Emin Yalman, Turkey in the
World War (New Haven, CT, 1930), 113–16; Erik-Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern His-
tory (London, 2004), 125. On capitulations, see Nasīm Sousa, The Capitulatory Régime
of Turkey, Its History, Origin, and Nature (Baltimore, MD, 1933), and Maurits H. van
den Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls, and
Beraths in the 18th Century (Leiden, 2005).
33 Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Garden City, NY, 1918),
130.
34 Morgenthau deﬁned the Levantines as follows: “nearly all had been born in Tur-
key and in many cases their families had been domiciled in that country for two or more
generations. The retention of their European citizenship is almost their only contact with
the nations from which they have sprung. Not uncommonly we meet in the larger cities
of Turkey men and women who are English by race and nationality, but who speak no
English, French being the usual language of the Levantine. The great majority have never
set foot in England, or in any other European country; they have only one home, and that
is Turkey” (ibid., 233).
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tons and 4,000 French.35 Too busy with the persecution of its own internal
enemies—Christians in general and the Armenians above all—the Committee
of Union and Progress (CUP) government did not devise a clear policy in re-
gard to these alien subjects: “Now and then, the Turkish ofﬁcials would retal-
iate upon one of their enemy aliens, usually in reprisal for some injury, inﬂicted
on their own subjects in enemy countries.”36 For many enemy aliens, the pos-
sibility of leaving the country and not ending up as hostages or military targets
depended on the negotiating ability of US ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr.,
or of the Apostolic delegate, the Cardinal Angelo Maria Dolci.37 The former
was entrusted with the protection of French, British, Serbian, and Belgian (later
also Italian) subjects. After wearisome negotiations he was able to organize the
departure of some of them, but he could not prevent foreign schools, monasteries,
and churches from being sequestered nor protect the three thousand enemy aliens
left in Constantinople from experiencing various forms of abuse.38
In Italy, a decree issued on May 2, 1915, three weeks before the country en-
tered the war, prevented foreigners from entering the country without a passport
and a visa. It also required all aliens, both in transit and residing on Italian ter-
ritory, to register; compelled employers to notify the government of the hiring
of foreigners; ordered landowners to communicate the sale of urban or rural es-
tates to foreigners; and instructed hotels to declare the presence of aliens.39
Once the freedom of departure or migration had been severely restricted, aliens
could move only if they possessed passports and followed various cumbersome
bureaucratic procedures. For enemy aliens departure was possible only through
bilaterally negotiated exchanges and the humanitarian actions that were mostly
promoted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or the Vat-
ican.40
The provisions aimed at controlling foreignerswere accompanied bymeasures
targeted speciﬁcally at enemy aliens, culminating with internment in concentra-
tion camps41 often accompanied by forced labor. Each country combined, in dif-
35 Archives Diplomatiques, France—Paris, La Courneuve, Correspondance Politique
et Commerciale (hereafter ADF, CPC), 938, copy of a letter of George Horton, the US con-
sul general, to the State Department, November 6, 1914.
36 Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, 254.
37 On Dolci’s activity in favor of enemy aliens and Christian subjects of the Ottoman
Empire, see the correspondence in Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Città del Vaticano,
Archivio della Delegazione Apostolica in Turchia (Mons. Angelo Maria Dolci, 1914–
23), boxes 97, 99, 100–106.
38 Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, chaps. 12 and 13.
39 Daniela L. Caglioti, “Why and How Italy Invented an Enemy Aliens Problem in
the First World War,” War in History 21, no. 2 (2014): 142–69, 147.
40 Annette Becker, Oubliés de la grande guerre (Paris, 1998).
41 Concentration camp (camp de concentration in French, Konzentrationslager in
German) was the standard term used to designate the sites where enemy civilians were kept
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ferent proportions, expulsion, repatriation/deportation, displacement, and above
all internment of enemy nationals (primarily, but not exclusively, men aged be-
tween ﬁfteen and forty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve, according to each country’s legislation
on conscription). In order to make the state of emergency more effective, nearly
all countries neutralized the judiciary by forbidding aliens and enemy aliens to
bring suit before the courts. Enemy aliens and denaturalized persons were thus
rendered entirely powerless and at the mercy of the public authorities.
Internment, at least internment on such a large scale, was a novelty for Eu-
rope. Notwithstanding the many protests of international humanitarian organi-
zations such as the Red Cross,42 concentration camps for civilians were opened
almost everywhere, ﬁrst in Europe and then in the United States, Brazil, the col-
onies and dominions of the British Empire, China, the French colonies, and oc-
cupied territories.Whether or not of arms-bearing age, civilians of enemy nation-
ality experienced conﬁnement in isolated and uncomfortable locations where
they had to report daily to the local police; some were even subjected to the ex-
treme hardship and boredom of internment in concentration camps, sometimes
for the entire war. Belligerent countries interned at least four hundred thousand
enemy aliens.43 The internment of civilians of enemy nationality started immedi-
ately. Britain interned in concentration camps more than thirty-two thousand
German and Austro-Hungarian subjects (over ﬁfty thousand if we include those
held in captivity in colonies and dominions)44 and France around sixty thou-
in captivity during the war. It translated into English the Spanish word reconcentrados,
which indicated the internment camps in Cuba during the Ten Years’ War (1868–78)
and again in the 1895–98 war. It was then largely used to denote the camp system during
the Anglo-BoerWar (1899–1902). See Jonathan Hyslop, “The Invention of the Concentra-
tion Camp: Cuba, Southern Africa and the Philippines, 1896–1907,” South African Histor-
ical Journal 63, no. 2 (2011): 251–76; Iain R. Smith and Andreas Stucki, “The Colonial
Development of Concentration Camps (1868–1902),” Journal of Imperial and Common-
wealth History 39, no. 3 (2011): 417–37. See also Robert Gerwarth and StephanMalinow-
ski, “Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts: Reﬂections on the Disputable Path from Windhoek to
Auschwitz,” Central European History 42, no. 2 (2009): 279–300, on the controversial
continuity between colonial violence and genocide in Europe.
42 Matthew Stibbe, “The Internment of Civilians by Belligerent States during the
First World War and the Response of the International Committee of the Red Cross,”
Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 1 (2006): 5–19.
43 Richard B. Speed III, Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War: A Study in the Di-
plomacy of Captivity (New York, 1990), 141. Matthew Stibbe has explored this subject
in depth; see in particular “Civilian Internment and Civilian Internees in Europe, 1914–
20,” Immigrants and Minorities 26, nos. 1–2 (2008): 49–81.
44 For Britain: Panikos Panayi, The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during
the First World War (Oxford, 1991), 70–98; for colonies and dominions, see the data
on German civilian internees published by the Prussian War Ministry: “Die Zivil- und
Kolonialgefangenen,” in Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses: 1919–1928, 3rd ser.,
ed. Deutscher Reichstag, vol. 3, no. 2 (Berlin, 1927), 820–22. To these data one must
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sand.45 Germany, which started to imprison British and French male subjects res-
ident in its territory as a retaliation measure, ended up by interningmore than one
hundred thousand enemy civilians (among them also women, children, and el-
derly people), mainly French and Belgians deported from occupied regions but
also persons of Russian, Polish, Rumanian, or US nationality.46 In the Russian
Empire, ﬁfty thousand enemy aliens were interned, and more than twenty-ﬁve
hundred thousand were deported.47 In the Habsburg Empire, enemy aliens were
destined, depending on their nationality and their social status, either to conﬁne-
ment or to internment.While British and French residents were expelled from the
cities and conﬁned to small, remote villageswhere they could bemore easily con-
trolled, Austro-Hungarians resorted to internment behind barbed wire for sub-
jects of the monarchy living in frontier areas, such as the Italians, Ruthenians,
or Serbs. Around twenty-eight thousand Italians and Italian-speaking Habsburg
subjects and at least four thousand suspected “Russophiles” fromGalicia andBu-
kovina were interned.48 Italy adopted a milder policy of conﬁnement. Austro-
Hungarian subjects were the ﬁrst to be affected by this policy and were conﬁned
in Sardinia, together with “dangerous” Italian citizens: anarchists, socialists, and
“austriacanti” (persons suspected of being in favor ofAustria-Hungary). Accord-
ing to a range of calculations, between 2,226 and 5,000 persons spent part or all
of the war in tiny villages in Sardinia. Later in the war, the fewGermans who had
remained on Italian territory were also conﬁned in central and southern Italian
small towns or islands.49
add the Austro-Hungarians. In Canada about 5,000 Ruthenians from Habsburg Galicia
were interned: LubomyrLuciuk, In Fearof the Barbed-Wire Fence:Canada’s First National
Internment Operations and the Ukrainian Canadians, 1914–1920 (Kingston, 2001).
45 According to the estimate by Jean-Claude Farcy, Les camps de concentration
français de la première guerre mondiale (1914–1920) (Paris, 1995), 129.
46 BAB, R901/82913, “Deutsche Retorsionsmassnahmen gegen feindliche Länder,”
Norddeutsche allgemeine Zeitung, November 9, 1914; Fréd Blanchod and Félix Speiser,
Rapport deMM. les Drs Blanchod&Speiser sur les visites aux camps et chantiers de travail
des prisonniers français en Allemagne, en Mars et Avril 1916 (Geneva, 1916); Christoph
Jahr, “Zivilisten als Kriegsgefangene: Die Internierung von ‘Feindstaaten-Ausländern’ in
Deutschland während des Ersten Weltkriegs am Beispiel des ‘Engländerlagers’ Ruh-
leben,” in In der Hand des Feindes: Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten
Weltkrieg, ed. Rüdiger Overmans (Cologne, 1999), 297–321, 315–16; Kenneth Steuer,
Pursuit of an “Unparalleled Opportunity”: The American YMCA and Prisoner of War
Diplomacy among the Central Power Nations during World War I, 1914–1923 (New
York, 2008), chap. 14, suggests the number of 3,602 US internees.
47 Lohr, Nationalizing, 123 and 127.
48 Matthew Stibbe, “Enemy Aliens, Deportees, Refugees: Internment Practices in the
Habsburg Empire, 1914–1918,” Journal of Modern European History 12, no. 4 (2014):
479–99.
49 Giovanna Procacci, “L’internamento di civili in Italia durante la prima guerra
mondiale: Normativa e conﬂitti di competenza,”Dep Deportate, esuli, profughe: Rivista
telematica di studi sulla memoria femminile, nos. 5/6 (2006): 33–66, and Caglioti, “Why
and How,” 163–65.
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As the war proceeded, the treatment of enemy aliens became more differenti-
ated as some alien civilians were subjected tomore detailed regulations and others
were categorized as protected foreigners. Some belligerent countries granted ex-
emptions to speciﬁc nationalities, thus transforming enemy aliens into friendly
aliens. Some Alsatians and Lorrainians, Poles, Czechs, and Czech-Slovaks re-
ceived better treatment in France, Britain, and Italy on the presumption that they
belonged to groups that were “enemies of our enemies” and “compatriots of those
who are ﬁghting for us in other places,” as British Home Secretary Sir George
Cave put it.50 In France exemptions also involved Jews “from the Levant,” Syr-
ians, and Armenians,51 while in Italy the government also gave immunity to Bul-
garians and in general to the vague category of “Ottoman subjects of non-Turkish
nationality.”52 More or less the same categories of enemy subjects—Alsatians
and Lorrainians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Ottoman Christians, and Austro-
Hungarian Italian-speaking subjects—were “granted full exemption from all
sanctions” in the Russian Empire as well.53 In Britain another set of exemptions
concerned enemy aliens in a bad health; “persons of enemy nationality who were
doing . . . work from which by reason of their special skill they could not well be
spared”; somewomenwho had become enemy aliens bymarriage;54 and “enemy
aliens who had their roots” in the country.55
On the other hand, governments, armies, and parliaments had to deal with the
varied and growing anxieties of their constituencies regarding friendly and neu-
tral aliens, as well as new waves of antisemitism. Public opinion and the nation-
alistic press became obsessed with foreigners who spoke the language of the
enemy: German-speaking Swiss experienced great difﬁculty in France or Italy,56
for example, while US citizens, being English-speaking, endured hardship in
Germany and Austria-Hungary. They were obsessed too with aliens who looked
like the enemy (e.g., the Chinese in Germany, who always had to have with them
a passport with a German stamp that helped distinguish them from the Japa-
50 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (hereafter Hansard, HCD),
“Sir G. Cave’s Statement,” July 11, 1918, 108:527.
51 Maunoury, Police de guerre, 26–27. On the privileged Ottoman subjects and in
particular on Ottoman Jews, see Sarah Abrevaya Stein, “Citizens of a Fictional Nation:
Ottoman-born Jews in France during the First World War,” Past & Present, no. 226
(2015): 227–54.
52 Edouard Clunet, “L’interdiction de commerce avec le sujets ennemis devant le
Parlement,” L’information, January 29 and 30, 1915. For Italy, Gazzetta ufﬁciale, Decreto
Luogotenenziale no. 1755, November 25, 1915, and no. 103, January 30, 1916; DL
no. 320, March 12, 1916.
53 Lohr, Russian Citizenship, 126, 131.
54 At the time, a woman who married a foreigner assumed the nationality of her hus-
band almost automatically and universally. See Helen Irving, Citizenship, Alienage, and
the Modern Constitutional State: A Gendered History (Cambridge, 2016).
55 “Sir G. Cave’s Statement,” 108:525.
56 On the Swiss in Italy, see Caglioti, “Why and How,” 149, 151–52.
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nese57); with recently as well as less recently naturalized people of enemy ori-
gin;58 with people who either bore an enemy name or had only recently changed
it;59 and with Jews, in particular Russian Jews, who were accused of unpatriotic
behavior in having failed to come back to their country of origin to enlist,60 or
whose loyalty as “friendly aliens” was questioned after the 1917 revolution.61
In order to respond to these concerns, governments of belligerent countries ex-
tended themeasures they had adopted to deal with enemy aliens to apply to aliens
of all kinds—friendly and neutral as well as enemy aliens. Britain took the lead.
The Aliens Restriction Act issued on August 5, 1914, gave the king the power to
impose restrictions of various kinds on any foreigner. The government made ex-
tensive use of this power, and in the spring of 1916 it introduced registration for
all aliens and an identity book for those who wanted to access prohibited areas.
The problem of identifying aliens and the need to trace their movements and con-
trol them more stringently remained at the center of the parliamentary debate in
Britain in 1917 and 1918, particularly in the days before the issue of amendments
to the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act.62 However, the attempt to in-
troduce a general national register of the entire population was doomed to failure,
both because of a lack of political consensus and support, as it was seen as a pre-
lude to conscription, and because it was seen as an “unnecessary and costly bu-
reaucracy, which interfered with the liberty of the individual.”63
Similar provisions soon spread in neutral countries such as Switzerland
(1917) and the Netherlands (1918),64 as well as outside Europe, where countries
57 BAB, R901/83618, Chinese Embassy to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
December 9, 1914.
58 On this see Section II of this article.
59 “Sir G. Cave’s Statement,” 108:530–31.
60 On Russian Jews in Britain, see David Cesarani, “Anti-Alienism in England after
the First World War,” Immigrants and Minorities 6, no. 1 (1987): 5–29. On the situation
of Russian Jews in France, see the report of a commission headed by Emile Durkheim in
Elkarati Nourredine, “Emile Durkheim, défenseur des réfugiés russes en France: Rap-
port sur la situation des russes du département de la Seine,” Genèses, no. 2 (1990):
168–77; Philippe-E. Landau, “Les Juifs russes à Paris pendant la Grande Guerre, cibles
de l’antisémitisme,” Archives Juives 34, no. 2 (2001): 43–56.
61 Sharman Kadish, “Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Community, Brit-
ain and the Russian Revolution,” Jewish Social Studies 50, nos. 3/4 (1988): 239–52, 243.
62 In one of these debates, the British home secretary proposed to “make that system
[the identity book] universal, so that every alien must have his identity book and can be
challenged or called upon to show it.” “Sir G. Cave’s Statement,” 108:533–34.
63 Rosemary Elliot, “An Early Experiment in National Identity Cards: The Battle
over Registration in the First World War,” Twentieth Century British History 17, no. 2
(2006): 145–76, esp. 175.
64 Frank Caestecker, “The Changing Modalities of Regulation in International Mi-
gration within Continental Europe,” in Regulation of Migration: International Experi-
ences, ed. Anita Böcker et al. (Amsterdam, 1998), 73–98, 76.
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such as New Zealand (1917) and Japan introduced compulsory registration for
aliens and other regulations concerning population movements (January 1918).
In April 1917, the French government issued two decrees that introduced a spe-
cial identity card for aliens.65 The purpose of the decrees was to facilitate the
identiﬁcation of foreigners, above all of enemy aliens, and to aid in the process
of revising the residence permits granted since the outbreak of the war—a pro-
cess that included rewarding with a residence permit certain categories of for-
eigners who deserved to be protected because of their loyalty and attachment
to France.66 By May 30, 1918, 140,252 persons had requested identity cards in
Paris and the surrounding region. Only a small portion of them were citizens of
enemy countries (1,983 individuals); more numerous were those who belonged
to protected categories even though they came from enemy countries: 4,505 Poles,
743Czechs, 445 Syrians, 995Armenians, 375Greeks “du Levant,” and 1,688 “Is-
raelites du Levant.”67
II. Wartime Naturalization Policies
If enemy aliens generated a lot of anxiety, a parallel and evenmore irrational and
exaggerated fear arose about naturalized people of enemy origin, and in partic-
ular those recently naturalized, or those who had changed their names. This fear-
fulness revealed the widespread “tendency to consider allegiance acquired at
birth more reliable than citizenship acquired by naturalization . . . or marriage.”68
The nationalistic press and nationalistic circles considered naturalization and
change of name to be strategies of disguise that were particularly dangerous be-
cause they had been planned in advance. Patriots and hardline politicians feared
that enemies could make use of new names that sounded characteristic of their
country of residence to spy and organize sabotage. Even though not all govern-
ments and policy makers shared this conviction, naturalizations were suspended
or banned almost everywhere as a preventative measure.
With the important exception of Germany, where the “wartime naturalization
policy was . . . more generous than it had been in peacetime,”69 after the outbreak
65 See Gérard Noiriel, La tyrannie du national: Le droit d’asile en Europe, 1793–
1993 (Paris, 1991), 177–80; Claire Zalc, Melting shops: Une histoire des commerçants
étrangers en France (Paris, 2010), 51–52.
66 ADF, CPC, 1895–1940, C-Administrative 27CPCOM, 258, “Note pour la Direc-
tion des affaires politiques et commerciales,” September 2, 1916.
67 Ibid., “État des étrangers résident dans le Départment de la Seine ayant sollicité
l’obtention d’une carte d’identité,” May 30, 1918; Belgians, Italians, Swiss, Russians,
Britons, and Spaniards were the most widely represented groups.
68 Andreas Fahrmeir, Citizenship: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Concept (New Ha-
ven, CT, 2007), 120–21.
69 Ibid., 121.
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of the war the number of granted certiﬁcates dropped dramatically in countries
that initially had adopted neither a ban nor speciﬁc regulations on the issue. In
Britain, France, the Russian Empire, and Italy, new rules and a change in the atti-
tude of ofﬁcials and public opinion made it harder to change nationality or acquire
a new one.
In nineteenth-century Europe, the number of naturalizations had risen in con-
nection with imperial ambitions and territorial changes, such as those caused by
the Italian wars of independence or the German wars of uniﬁcation, and with
the plebiscites or treaties that regulated the right of people living in borderlands
affected by territorial changes to opt for one citizenship or another.70 Changes in
citizenship laws—the 1870 British naturalization statute or the introduction of
the jus soli and the double jus soli in France in 1889,71 to cite only two exam-
ples—had further modiﬁed the citizen/noncitizen divide, also increasing the
opportunity for people with non-native parents to gain the status of nationals.
However, for the majority of migrants, naturalization remained the only legal
and transparent procedure by which to acquire a new citizenship status.
There are few reliable statistics, but the available data show that in the decade
preceding thewar the number of naturalizations granted had not been particularly
high, suggesting that only a few migrants were interested in changing their na-
tionalities, or that only a few of them were allowed to do so.72 In Britain, an av-
erage of 1,036 naturalizations per year had been granted between 1904 and 1913
70 I am thinking in particular of the treaties that regulated the transfer of the sover-
eignty of Nice and Savoy in 1859, of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, and of Alsace and
Lorrain in 1871.
71 Double jus solimeans awarding citizenship at birth to children with at least one par-
ent who was born in the state, although of foreign nationality. See Patrick Weil, Qu’est-ce
qu’un français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution (Paris, 2004),
78–85.
72 The data used in this article come from ofﬁcial statistics and publications or from
secondary literature (references are given in the appropriate footnotes). Their level of detail
and accuracy depends on each country’s legislation and the attitude of their bureaucracy.
For example, British returns listed naturalized people by name, former nationality, and
place of residence in annual reports, while French individual data are scattered and difﬁcult
to process, although there are statistics available in an aggregated form. The statistics are
not always comparable. The British ones, for example, underestimated the number of nat-
uralized people because they did not, especially before the war, include foreign-bornwives
and children who enjoyed a derivative citizenship. French statistics, in contrast, include
women (and list children as dependents), but they do not explain whether they were the
wives of the naturalized or whether they were nonmarried individuals petitioning only
for themselves. Data on requests and application rejections are even fewer. For Britain,
see Benno Gammerl, Staatsbürger, Untertanen und Andere: Der Umgang mit ethnischer
Heterogenität im Britischen Weltreich und im Habsburgerreich 1867–1918 (Göttingen,
2010), 227–28.
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(33 percent to people of German or Austro-Hungarian origin).73 In the same pe-
riod in France the ﬁgures were higher, although much smaller than the number
of migrants who regularly entered the country: there were on average 2,941 nat-
uralizations per year (a ﬁgure that rises to 4,320 if we add the foreign-born chil-
dren of the naturalized) out of a foreign population that had reached 1,160,000
by the 1911 census.74 In fact, as demonstrated by Patrick Weil, France was fully
engaged in the integration of the second generation after the reform of the citizen-
ship law in 1889; it paid less attention to ﬁrst-generation immigrants, even those
who had arrived decades earlier.75 Italy, a country of emigration, had granted only
ninety-two naturalizations per year between 1899 and 1911.76 By contrast, be-
tween 1885 and 1903 Austria-Hungary granted an average of 3,354 naturaliza-
tions per year.77 And Prussia, which had started in the decade between 1895
and 1905 to transform itself into an immigration country,78 registered an average
of 8,984 naturalizations per year from 1909 to 1911 out of a foreign population of
688,839 in 1910.79 However, the number of naturalizations did not compensate
for the number of German migrants who, thanks to the ten-years-residence-
abroad rule, had lost their Prussian citizenship in the previous decades.80
There are many reasons for the low rate of naturalization and for the fact that
the rate was so diverse among these countries. There were not many incentives
to naturalize. In peacetime, foreigners enjoyed both full legal rights and exemp-
73 “Summary of the Certiﬁcates Registered at the Home Ofﬁce in each year from
1904 to 1913 Inclusive,” in Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, Aliens (natural-
ization): Return showing the names of all aliens to whom certiﬁcates of naturalization of
re-admission to British nationality have been issued and whose oaths of allegiance
have, during the year ended the 31st day of December 1914, been registered at the
Home Ofﬁce, giving the country and place of residence of the person naturalized or
re-admitted, and including information as to any aliens who have, during the same pe-
riod, obtained acts of naturalization from the legislature . . . dated 24 April 1914 (Lon-
don, 1914) (hereafter PP, HC/ANR), 1914 (206), 52. The average calculations are mine
and are always given in round numbers. Since the ﬁgures are very small, I did not round
them up to the nearest one hundred or one thousand.
74 Les naturalisations en France (1870–1940) (Paris, 1942), 24. Weil, Qu’est-ce
qu’un français?, 102, for the number of foreigners.
75 Weil, Qu’est-ce qu’un français?, 93 and 98–102.
76 Vito Francesco Gironda, Die Politik der Staatsbürgerschaft: Italien und Deutsch-
land im Vergleich 1800–1914 (Göttingen, 2010), 277.
77 Gammerl, Staatsbürger, 82.
78 Dieter Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschliessen: Die Nationalisierung der
Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttin-
gen, 2001), 185.
79 Ibid., 242 n. 222. According to Dieter Gosewinkel’s estimate, more than 120,000
naturalizations (an average of 6,350 per year) occurred from 1896 to 1914. Prussia ac-
counted for 60–62.4 percent of Germany’s entire population.
80 Ibid., 241. Gosewinkel calculated that there were ﬁve times more denaturaliza-
tions than naturalizations in the decade 1872–82.
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tion from military service in the majority of the countries under examination in
this article, and there was a deterrent effect from the bias against dual citizen-
ship that made it difﬁcult for naturalized citizens to retain their former citizen-
ship. The different regulations on migrant mobility in different countries and
the diverse regimes of expulsion and deportation must also have affected the
difﬁcult and nonreversible decision of whether or not to apply for naturaliza-
tion, embrace a new nationality, and risk being drafted. Before the First World
War, securing citizenship status was certainly more necessary for migrants in
countries with higher rates of expulsion and deportation, such as Prussia, than
it was in France or Britain, where children of migrants were considered natives
when born in the country.81 Naturalization procedures also entailed costs that
could prove prohibitive for poor migrants, among them the many Jews coming
from Eastern Europe—as, for example, in Britain, where after 1880 the fee rose
from one to ﬁve pounds sterling, plus a stamp duty of 1.5s.;82 France, where
people had to pay 175.25 francs as “droits de sceau”; or the Ottoman Empire,
where Russian Jews were required to pay 40 francs per capita, a sum considered
“high” and “impossible” to pay.83 Furthermore, this low rate of naturalizations,
especially if compared with the far higher rate of naturalization in countries
such as the United States, can be explained by the larger presence in Europe
of short-distance, seasonal, and temporary migrants.
When war broke out, almost all pending applications were frozen. In France,
naturalizations dropped to 2,117 in 1914 from 3,447 in 1913 and then ceased
entirely; naturalizations on the basis of the civil code resumed only after June 28,
1919.84 Britain did not ofﬁcially ban naturalization but granted certiﬁcates at a
much slower pace than in the prewar years; the government rejected almost all
applications received from Germans who were longtime British residents and
“postponed indeﬁnitely” those ﬁled by Russians and Poles.85 Naturalizations had
reached a peak of 1,709 in 1913; thereafter they dropped to 1,211 in 1914 (with
only 347 new certiﬁcates granted after the outbreak of the war),86 983 in 1915,
571 in 1916, 245 in 1917, and 269 in 1918.87With the war, the divergence in nat-
81 Caestecker, “The Transformation”; Reinecke, Grenzen; Rosental, “Migrations.”
82 J. M. Ross, “Naturalization of Jews in England,” Transactions & Miscellanies
(Jewish Historical Society of England) 24 (1970–73): 59–62, 67; Gainer, The Alien In-
vasion, 55. Starting with February 26, 1913, the fee was lowered to £3, but raised to £10
in 1920. See National Archives, London (hereafter TNA), HO 45/12183.
83 For France, seeWeil,Qu’est-ce qu’un français?, 86; for the Ottoman Empire, see Li-
brary of Congress, Washington, DC, Henry Morgenthau’s Papers, Correspondence (here-
after LoC, HMP-C), Ruppin to Morgenthau from Jaffa, November 27, 1914, container 7.
84 Les naturalisations en France (1870–1940) (Paris, 1942), 23–24.
85 Charles Edward Troup, The Home Ofﬁce (London, 1925), 152–53.
86 PP, HC/ANR, 1914–16 (156), 39 and my elaboration.
87 PP, HC/ANR, 1916 (88) 52; 1917–18 (129), 34; 1918 (47), 22; 1919 (74) 22.
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uralization dynamics between Europe and the United States increased. While in
Europe both migration and naturalization rates plunged, in the United States the
dramatic decline in migration rates was compensated by a sharp rise in both pe-
titions for and concessions of certiﬁcates of naturalization, probably also as a re-
action to the war.88
These restrictive European policies on naturalization allowed for exceptions,
however. During the war in Britain, for example, readmissions to citizenship
were more signiﬁcant than naturalizations. Between August 1914 and 1918,
1,640 former subjects who had lost their citizenship were readmitted. This prac-
tice favored above all British-born women (96.6 percent of all persons readmit-
ted to British nationality) who had lost their nationality because of marriage with
a foreigner.89 Restrictive policies also allowed for discretionary practices, espe-
cially at the beginning of the conﬂict when there was still hope that it would
be settled rapidly and when particularly important economic reasons were in-
volved. In Britain, for example, at the very time that the Aliens Restriction Act
was being enacted, Baron Bruno Schröder, a German banker in London, and
his associate partner, Julius Rittershaussen, were granted British naturalization
papers in great haste.90 Thirty-two Austro-Hungarians, 121 Germans, and three
Ottomans also took the oath of allegiance between August and December 1914.91
Except for readmissions and a few special cases, like that of Baron Schröder,
only one universally accepted path to naturalization was still accessible during
the war, and that was enlistment. Fighting for the state and sacriﬁcing oneself
for the preservation of the nation or the empire were clear signs of loyalty and
the desire to belong, and they were prerequisites of any citizenship claim. The
emergency, and the shortage of manpower in particular, created opportunities
for some individuals and categories of people while they closed those very same
opportunities for others. In certain countries, naturalization was thus granted
to men who were willing to ﬁght (or willing to work) for the nation, including
individuals who had been systematically excluded from the nation only a few
years before the war (e.g., Russian Jews in Germany). Granting naturalization
to foreigners in exchange for enlistment sometimes proved easier than forcing
the return of fellow nationals who had emigrated all over the world.
In France, for example, a series of laws issued between the outbreak of the
war and 1915 expanded the boundaries of citizenship for those willing to die for
the country. A law passed on August 5, 1914, established that all Alsatian and
88 For US data, see Susan B. Carter, ed., Historical Statistics of the United States
(Cambridge, 2006).
89 My elaboration on PP, HC/ANR, quoted in notes 86 and 87.
90 Richard Roberts, Schroders: Merchants and Bankers (Basingstoke, 1992), 152–
59.
91 PP, HC/ANR, 1914 (206), 52. The numbers of women in these groups were ﬁve,
forty-four, and zero, respectively.
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Lorrainian males, including those born after 1870, could recover French nation-
ality provided that they voluntarily signed up for the entire war.92 The same law
authorized the government to naturalize foreigners who enlisted for the war’s
entire duration.93 Contrary to the normal naturalization procedure, this conces-
sion was strictly individual and did not extend to wives and children. Alsatian
and Lorrainian women who were born after 1870 and had not requested rein-
tegration before the war no longer received automatic naturalization when mar-
rying a Frenchman, nor when marrying an Alsatian or Lorrainian serving in the
French army, according to a law passed on March 17, 1917. Indeed, the same
law made it difﬁcult for all alien women to become citizens by marriage with a
Frenchman. Spy fever and anti-Germanism convinced public opinion and dep-
uties that, in the state of exception produced by the war, the automatic conces-
sion of citizenship to women upon marriage had to be stopped. Women might
use this “privilege” either to spy and inﬁltrate French lines or to avoid expulsion
or internment as enemy aliens. Marriages with alien women during the war thus
required a special authorization granted by the Secretary of Justice.94 As a result
of the August 5, 1914, law, the French government naturalized 3,351 males be-
tween 1917 and 1926. The majority of them came from Italy, Spain, Belgium,
and Switzerland.95 Naturalization was also granted to a few colonial subjects,
but not to the more than 220,000 North Africans, Malagasies, or Chinese who
worked in state-run factories for the entire duration of the war substituting for
Frenchmen enlisted in the army: they were immediately repatriated when their
contracts expired.96
The acquisition of citizenship through enlistment was also a method used by
members of minority groups and those who enjoyed a B-type citizenship, as,
for example, colonial subjects of the French Empire who saw the war as an op-
portunity to “secure unique civic freedom within an assimilationist state.”97 The
legislation introduced by Blaise Diagne that passed on October 19, 1915, and
92 Loi relative à l’admissions des Alsaciens-Lorrains dans l’Armée française, Au-
gust 5, 1914, article 1.
93 Ibid., article 3.
94 Edouard Clunet, “La nationalité et la guerre,” Le Temps, August 25, 1917.
95 Les naturalisations, 24–25.
96 In 1919, colonial male subjects accounted for 25 of 218 naturalizations granted for
serving in the army. See France, Ministère de la Justice, Compte général de l’admin-
istration de la justice civile et commerciale pendant l’année 1919 . . . France-Algèrie-
Tunisie (Paris, 1924), table 41, 137. Bertrand Nogaro and Lucien Weil, La main-d’œuvre
étrangère & coloniale pendant la guerre (Paris, 1926), 18.
97 Sarah Zimmerman, “Citizenship, Military Service and Managing Exceptionalism:
Originaires in World War I,” in Empires in World War I: Shifting Frontiers and Imperial
Dynamics in a Global Conﬂict, ed. Richard Fogarty and Andrew Jarboe (London, 2014),
219–48, 243.
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September 29, 1916, for example, “tied originaires’ full citizenship to obliga-
tory military service,” good behavior, and excellent performance on the battle-
ﬁeld.98
In Russia, the government “tightened up requirements that foreign males nat-
uralized during the war immediately enter military service,”99 and an equation
between patriotism and citizenship was established “very much in the spirit of
the levée en masse.”100 As Melissa Stockdale notes, “Patriotism as a criterion of
national belonging was inclusive and participatory, since every individual, re-
gardless of faith or class or ethnicity, could (at least theoretically) be a patriot
and demonstrate patriotism. Conversely, those who were not loyal, or would
not serve and sacriﬁce, merited exclusion.”101 In fact, the army and the way in
which recruitment, participation, and reward were managed contributed to has-
tening “the reconﬁguration of identities that was part of the longer term shift
in the way Imperial society was structured, from traditional dynastic, confes-
sional and estate categories to categories of class and ethnicity.”102 Instead of
an increase in cohesion and inclusion, war “intensiﬁed existing hostilities among
the subject peoples”103 of the empire and fostered intense anti-Jewish attitudes.104
After the Moscow riots of June 1915, the government of the Russian Empire
established “an outright ban on all naturalization of enemy subjects and neutral
subjects who entered the country after the declaration of war.”105
In Britain, Home Secretary Edward Shortt declared to the House of Com-
mons that “certiﬁcates of naturalization have been granted to considerable num-
98 Ibid., 226, and Marc Michel, “La genèse du recrutement de 1918 en Afrique noire
française,” Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer 58, no. 213 (1971): 433–50, 442. The
originaires were a particular group of Senegalese subjects who enjoyed limited French
citizenship accompanied by the privilege of maintaining certain cultural customs such as
polygamy and sharia. On this topic I owe special thanks to Meredith Terretta.
99 Lohr, Russian Citizenship, 127.
100 Mark Von Hagen, “The Levée en masse from Russian Empire to Soviet Union,
1874–1938,” inPeople in Arms:MilitaryMyth andNationalMobilization since the French
Revolution, ed. Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron (Cambridge, 2003), 159–88, 168.
101 Melissa K. Stockdale, “United in Gratitude: Honoring Soldiers and Deﬁning the
Nation in Russia’s Great War,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 7,
no. 3 (2006): 459–85, 484–85.
102 Von Hagen, “The Levée en masse,” 169.
103 Ibid., 170.
104 Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, Jews in the Russian Army, 1827–1917: Drafted into
Modernity (Cambridge, 2009).
105 Lohr, Russian Citizenship, 127. Naturalizations resumed only after the revolution,
when the ﬁrst decrees issued by the Bolsheviks abolished restrictions based on nation-
ality and religion and, driven by a strong “commitment to internationalism,” opened the
doors to “foreigners who were members of the working class,” “the class of peasants that
did not exploit hired labor,” and socialist activists. See Alexopoulos, “Soviet Citizen-
ship,” 491–92.
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bers of friendly aliens who have served in His Majesty’s Forces,” but he also
noted that “an Amendment was introduced into Section 2 of the British Nation-
ality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, by the legislation passed last summer which
had the effect of making a period of service with HisMajesty’s Forces equivalent
to a period of residence in the United Kingdom for purposes of naturalisation.”106
In fact, the number of certiﬁcates granted on this basis was far from “consider-
able” during the war (77 men out of 224 obtained naturalization thanks to this
provision in 1917 and 144 out of 236 in 1918), but it became increasingly so
immediately after the war, when 3,612 (72 percent) out of 5,016 naturalization
certiﬁcates issued between 1919 and 1922 were granted for “Service in His
Majesty’s Forces.”107
Acquiring citizenship through enlistment was also an opportunity for foreign-
born men in Prussia. The 1913 German citizenship law was based not only on
the jus sanguinis principle but also on the idea that there could be no Volksge-
meinschaft without aWehrgemeinschaft. In a nutshell, military service was a re-
quirement that could be used as an alternative to the ethnocultural one.108 As “a
statist, or civic, conception of nationalism appeared to triumph over narrower
ethnic deﬁnitions,”109 the patriotic path to naturalization remained open and,
in fact, easier.110 In Prussia, as in the rest of Germany, naturalizations continued
to be granted to former Germans who had lost citizenship because they had re-
sided abroad for more than ten years, to “resident aliens from disadvantaged eth-
nic and religious groups”who enlisted in the army, and to Russian Germans who
either returned, voluntarily or forcibly, or who happened to be in the occupied
territories of Eastern Europe and who were at the center of German relocation
plans.111 Contrary to what was happening in France or Britain, “the result, in
Prussia, was an increase of some three thousand naturalizations each year over
the 1914 ﬁgure, at least in 1915 and 1916.”112 Then, 1917 and 1918 saw a de-
crease. A similar trend was also observed in Baden and Bavaria.113 The neces-
sities of war, the occupation, and the conquest of new territories and the urgency
of strengthening the army also induced a relaxation of the antisemitic, discrim-
106 Hansard, HCD, February 24, 1919, 112:1425–6W.
107 For 1917 and 1918, see note 87; for 1919–22, see PP, HC/ANR, 1919 (74); 1920
(95); 1921 (94); 1922 (116). This is my calculation.
108 Gosewinkel, Einbürgern, 326.
109 Annemarie Sammartino, The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914–
1922 (Ithaca, NY, 2010), 24.
110 Oliver Trevisiol, Die Einbürgerungspraxis im Deutschen Reich, 1871–1945
(Göttingen, 2006), 47–48.
111 Gosewinkel, Einbürgern, 331–37.
112 Eli Nathans, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility and Na-
tionalism (Oxford, 2004), 185.
113 Trevisiol, Die Einbürgerungspraxis, 66.
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inatory Prussian citizenship policy. Non-German Jews who enlisted were more
likely to see their naturalization petitions approved during the war rather than at
any other time during the previous twenty-ﬁve years.114 The two sons of Jakob
Borg were naturalized in this way, for example—but their loyalty to the German
army did not prevent the expulsion of their father, a tobacco entrepreneur who
had lived in Danzig since 1887, even though he had repeatedly applied for nat-
uralization showing his willingness to become a Prussian citizen.115 According
to Wertheimer and Gosewinkel’s calculations, the naturalizations of Jews rose
from 1.5 to 2.5 percent per year (of total naturalizations) to 9 percent in 1914
and to 7.7 percent in 1915 (624 out of 8,087).116
In Italy, too, jurists supported the idea that citizenship could be granted to
foreigners provided they had Italian origins and enlisted in the Italian army.117
In this and all of the cases mentioned above, however, the relatively small num-
bers of those naturalized demonstrated that the European states at war remained
very wary of foreigners, especially in empires such as the French or the British
that could count on colonial troops or contracted laborers such as Chinese.118
This is illustrated dramatically when we compare the numbers of enlisted men
naturalized in Britain or France with those in the United States, where, thanks
to an act passed on May 9, 1918, in only one year “a total of 128,000 foreign sol-
diers were naturalized.”119
Naturalization could also be granted during the war to large groups of people
in the hope of neutralizing their potential dangerousness and keeping the em-
pire together. On his arrival in Syria at the end of 1914 to supervise military
and civilian affairs, Djemal Pasha issued a regulation that offered wholesale Ot-
toman naturalization to Russian Jews in Palestine in exchange for not being ex-
pelled.120 The US Ambassador Henry Morgenthau estimated at ﬁfty to sixty
thousand the number of Russian Jews in need of citizenship to secure their res-
114 Nathans, The Politics of Citizenship, 185.
115 This case is recounted by Jack Wertheimer, Unwelcome Strangers: East European
Jews in Imperial Germany (New York, 1987), 56.
116 Ibid., 57; Dieter Gosewinkel, “‘Unerwünschte Elemente’—Einwanderung und
Einbürgerung der Jude in Deutschland 1848–1933,” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche
Geschichte 27 (1998): 71–106, 97.
117 G. C. Buzzati, “Note sulla cittadinanza,” Rivista di diritto civile 8 (1916): 485–
506.
118 Christian Koller, “The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and
Their Deployment in Europe during the First World War,” Immigrants and Minorities
26, nos. 1/2 (2008): 111–33; Guoqi Xu, Strangers on the Western Front: Chinese Workers
in the Great War (Cambridge, MA, 2011).
119 Weil, The Sovereign Citizen, 46.
120 Arthur Ruppin, Memoirs, Diaries, Letters (New York, 1972), 152.
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idence in the area after becoming enemy aliens.121 The Ottomanization of these
particular enemy aliens was partly negotiated with local Jewish leaders, such as
Arthur Ruppin, and with the crucial help of US ambassador Henry Morgen-
thau.122 It was partly enforced with “severe treatment” and “the worst kind of
threats.”123 With Ottoman citizenship, which was granted against the payment
of 37 francs for each family, Russian Jews obtained an exemption from military
service.124
Ottomanization was considered by Arthur Ruppin “a heavy blow to the Jew-
ish population” because it put a temporary stop to the Zionist project.125 On Jan-
uary 18, 1915, he wrote from Jerusalem: “Nearly 4,000 Russian, French and
English Jews who did not want to become naturalized have been forced to leave
Palestine (15–18,000 have accepted naturalization). All Zionist emblems (the
Star of David, ﬂags, even the innocent stamps to collect money for the JNF,
etc.) have been prohibited, and anyone displaying them is to be punished.”126
On the other hand, Ottomanization helped prevent harsher treatment of the ma-
jority of the Jews who had already settled in Palestine; in particular, it prevented
“their being concentrated or summarily expelled,”127 as had happened on De-
cember 17, 1914, when “500 Russian Jews were suddenly rounded up by the
kaimakam in Jaffa and deported to Egypt by sea.”128 Decisions on both natural-
ization and denaturalization depended on the different perceptions of the secu-
rity threat. The Sublime Porte wanted to avoid “making Palestine a Russian
villayet by permitting a large number of Russian Jews to settle there and con-
tinue to remain Russian subjects”129 and hoped that Ottomanization of the Rus-
sian Jews could neutralize or sterilize the emergence of another national question
within the empire, as Halil Serif Pasha, president of the parliament, explicitly
stated to Morgenthau.130 In fact, naturalization stopped neither the colonization
nor the harsh treatment of Jews. In the followingmonths, as Ruppin recalled, they
underwent “new ordeals, that arose from lack of conﬁdence of the local Ofﬁcials
toward our work of colonization and which led to numerous law suits, arrests,
and to many Jews being sent into exile.”131
121 Turkey entered the war against Russia onNovember 11, 1914. For the estimate, see
LoC, HMP-C, Morgenthau to Schiff, Marshall, and Strauss, October 21, 1914, con. 6.
122 Ibid., Morgenthau to Louis Marshall, November 29, 1914, con. 7. The negotia-
tion can be followed by reading the correspondence in cons. 14 and 15.
123 Ibid., Morgenthau to Wise, January 25, 1915, con. 15.
124 Ibid., Ruppin to Morgenthau, March 29, 1915, con. 7.
125 Ruppin, Memoirs, 152.
126 Ibid., 154.
127 LoC, HMP-C, Morgenthau to Wise, January 25, 1915, con. 15.
128 Ruppin, Memoirs, 153.
129 LoC, HMP-C, Morgenthau to Wise, July 22, 1914, con. 14.
130 Ibid., Morgenthau to Wise, December 1, 1915, con. 15.
131 Ibid., Ruppin to Morgenthau, March 29, 1915, con. 7.
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III. Denaturalization and the “Ethnic” Dimension of Citizenship
But even more than for naturalizations, “theWorldWar crisis of 1914–1918 was
responsible for the spread of denaturalization statutes over the European conti-
nent.”132 Denaturalization provisions were a by-product of emergency legislation
that passed without any opposition or impediment into peacetime nationality
laws after 1918,133 paving the way for the denaturalization policies implemented
in Nazi Germany, Romania, Vichy France, and Italy. Driven by concerns over
security, domestic subversion, and espionage, almost all the countries at war re-
sorted to denaturalization of individuals and groups. Denaturalization began in
France with a law passed on April 7, 1915, and culminated in the postwar mass
denaturalization proclaimed and implemented in BolshevikRussia between 1921
and 1924, which created about two million stateless individuals.134
After the French revolution, “the principle of denationalization . . . developed
along two lines: as a right of the citizen to change his allegiance, e.g., by nat-
uralization in another country; and as a sanction for acts considered criminal,
or at least prejudicial to his country, e.g., military or public service in another
country, or refusal to return in time of war.”135 As concerns about security grew
during the First World War, politicians and bureaucracies went after people
whose conduct could be considered prejudicial to the country andwho, they con-
tended, in the year before thewar, had obtained naturalization by fraud. But states
at war ﬁrst had to legislate in order to sanction internal enemies of this particular
kind, whose main fault was having the wrong national origin. While the United
States used a 1906 law on naturalizations and denaturalization,136 the European
nations of France, Britain, Portugal, and Romania adopted new provisions to act
against naturalized individuals during the war, and Belgium, Italy, and Turkey
introduced norms on denaturalization after 1918.137
Press campaigns and heated discussions in parliaments accompanied lawmak-
ing. Nationalistic and patriotic newspapers in France, Britain, the Russian Em-
132 “Recent Trends in Denaturalization in the United States and Abroad,” Columbia
Law Review 44, no. 5 (1944): 736–51, 739.
133 For a comparative analysis of the loss of nationality provisions, see Durward V.
Sandifer, “A Comparative Study of Laws Relating to Nationality at Birth and to Loss of
Nationality,” American Journal of International Law 29, no. 2 (1935): 248–79.
134 Golfo Alexopoulos, Stalin’s Outcasts: Aliens, Citizens, and the Soviet State,
1926–1936 (Ithaca, NY, 2003); Lohr, Russian Citizenship, 147–51.
135 “Recent Trends,” 737 n. 5.
136 According to John L. Cable, Loss of Citizenship, Denaturalization, the Alien in
Wartime (Washington, DC, 1943), iv: “During the First World war there was a marked
increase in the number of denaturalization cases”; but Weil, The Sovereign Citizen, 3,
maintains that only 1 percent of denaturalizations in the twentieth-century United States
occurred during wars.
137 “Recent Trends,” 739–42.
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pire, and Italy were obsessed with these “disguised” citizens, and in the French,
British, and Italian parliamentsmany voices from both the left and the right raised
the issue of defending the citizenship boundary. In Britain, “those in parliament
and the business community who demanded the removal of enemy inﬂuence
from British industry and commerce often made clear that they considered Brit-
ish subjects of enemy origin equally as objectionable as enemy aliens.”138 As An-
drew Bonar Law declared on May 13, 1915: “There are Germans who became
British subjects purely for business reasons, and who have not changed in their
feelings of sympathy for Germany.”139 And Horatio Bottomley, one of the fore-
most hardline MPs of the Liberal Party, writing in John Bull, a magazine known
for having “played a role in creating a persecutorymood towardsGermanswithin
the United Kingdom,”140 demanded that naturalized persons “‘be compelled to
wear a distinctive badge’ and [that] none of their children ‘should be allowed
to attend any school’.”141 French newspapers such as L’Information spread ru-
mors that many Germans had taken out US citizenship to save their assets from
sequestration.142 Italian members of parliament and ofﬁcials advanced a similar
argument. They feared that Germans might become Swiss nationals or apply to
become Italian citizens according to the provisions of Article 3 of the 1912 Italian
citizenship law in order to return to Italy, move freely, avoid sequestration of their
assets, and resume their economic activities.143
In Germany, denaturalization was used as a sanction against those who put
themselves outside of the Wehrgemeinschaft: draft dodgers and deserters.144 In
the Russian Empire, the need to improve control over its own subjects and the
concern that former Russian subjects who, having migrated and become natural-
ized in another country, might return “on foreign passports as spies” resulted in a
ban on denaturalization.145 Similar convictions persuaded the Serbian govern-
ment to decree, on September 21, 1916, that all persons who had left Bosnia
and did not return by the end of October would automatically lose their Bosnian
Landesangehörigkeit.146 The obsession with spies and traitors also caused the
138 Bird, Control, 334.
139 Quoted by A. Lentin, Banker, Traitor, Scapegoat, Spy?: The Troublesome Case of
Sir Edgar Speyer; an Episode of the Great War (London, 2013), 57–58.
140 Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War
(Cambridge, 2008), 41.
141 In an article published in John Bull, May 15, 1915, quoted by Lentin, Banker, 63.
142 Weil, Qu’est-ce qu’un français?, 104.
143 Caglioti, “Why and How,” 151. Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Roma, Presidenza
del Consiglio dei Ministri, Guerra Europea, b. 124, fasc. 19-5-8, “Telegramma della
Prefettura di Milano al Ministro degli Interni,” July 9, 1915.
144 Gosewinkel, Einbürgern, 328.
145 Lohr, Russian Citizenship, 121.
146 Gammerl, Staatsbürger, 167.
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Austro-Hungarian government to refrain from introducing denaturalization prac-
tices, notwithstanding the numerous plans put forward by the army. The Hungar-
ian government in particular considered that controlling citizens involved in
treacherous activity would be easier and more efﬁcient than monitoring for-
eigners.147
Britain had been the ﬁrst country to introduce denaturalization provisions.
Article 7 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, approved on Au-
gust 7, 1914, and put into effect on January 1, 1915, established that it was in
the power of the secretary of state to revoke certiﬁcates of naturalization if they
had been “obtained by false representation or fraud.”148 The timing was acci-
dental since the act was the result of a long parliamentary debate that had taken
place before the outbreak of the war. Denaturalization thus did not enter the Brit-
ish legislation as a war measure, and consequently nationalistic public opinion
and radical MPs considered the procedure to be too mild and ineffective. During
the war, anti-German associations campaigned for a “drastic reform of the nat-
uralization laws” and “‘to preserve effectually the heritage of British blood’
from any ‘foreign tramp who asks for it at the Home Ofﬁce’.”149 Notwithstand-
ing the protest, the government maintained a low proﬁle and a liberal attitude.
It did not implement the provision and rejected the recommendations made by
a House of Commons committee appointed to investigate the enemy aliens issue.
Among the proposals rejected were the review and cancellation of “all the certif-
icates of naturalizations granted to enemy aliens since January 1, 1914”; an inves-
tigation of persons of enemy alien origin who had been granted certiﬁcates of
naturalization prior to January 1, 1914; and a review of “naturalization certiﬁ-
cates granted to subjects of neutral nations since August 1, 1914.”150 Liberals
and hardliners eventually reached a compromise in the amendment to the British
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act in August 1918.151 The amendment added
new grounds for the repeal of naturalizations and created a special judicial com-
mittee, the Certiﬁcates of Naturalisation (Revocation) Committee, chaired by a
147 Ulrike von Hirschhausen, “From Imperial Inclusion to National Exclusion: Citi-
zenship in the Habsburg Monarchy and in Austria, 1867–1923,” European Review of
History 16, no. 4 (2009): 551–73, 558.
148 This revocation was not possible under the Naturalization Act of 1870. See the
British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914.
149 Panikos Panayi, “The British Empire Union in the FirstWorldWar,” Immigrants and
Minorities 8, nos. 1–2 (1989): 113–28, 115–16. Also SvenOliverMüller, “Recht undRasse:
Die Ethniesierung von Staatsangehörigkeit und Nationsvorstellung in Großbritannien im
ersten Weltkrieg,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 30, no. 3 (2004): 379–403.
150 See TNA, CAB 24/24/57/76, “Enemy Aliens: Report to the Prime Minister of Sir
H. Dalziel’s Committee,” July 9, 1918. See also the intervention on the report of the
home secretary: “Sir G. Cave’s Statement,” 108:522–605.
151 The bill received royal assent on August 8, 1918.
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High Court judge, to settle controversial cases.152 Between 1918 and 1930, the
committee revoked 234 certiﬁcates of naturalization, 232 of which had been
granted to men. Of these revocations, 135 concerned British nationals of former
enemy alien origin (112 Germans, 18 former Austro-Hungarians, and 5 Turks),
who thus became stateless. Denaturalization affected not only people who had
spent most of their lives in Britain and who had enjoyed British nationality for
decades but also their spouses and children.153 Louis Herig, for example, had
considered himself a British subject since October 27, 1873. On February 6,
1919, the committee labeled him “German,” stripped him of his nationality,
and made him stateless. Other revocations affected 55 individuals of German,
Austro-Hungarian, or Ottoman origins whose certiﬁcates had been issued be-
tween 1875 and 1899, 70 who had been naturalized between 1900 and the end
of July 1914, and 9 who had obtained naturalization papers between August
1914 and 1915.154 Because of the vast amount of argument and debate that it pro-
voked, the most famous case of denaturalization was that of Edgar Speyer and
his wife and three daughters. Speyer, a businessman and a philanthropist natural-
ized in 1892 who had achieved wealth and many honors (such as baronetage
and membership in the Privy Council), was denaturalized in December 1921.155
France, unlike Britain, introduced denaturalization provisions ten months af-
ter the outbreak of the war and implemented them immediately. After a four-
month debate in both parliament chambers, a law was issued on April 7, 1915,
that authorized the administrative denaturalization of persons of enemy origin
who had maintained (or who were thought to have maintained) their previous
nationality; who had left the country to avoid conscription; who had taken up
arms against France or helped the enemy (article 1); or who had obtained French
citizenship after January 1, 1913 (article 2). This law led ﬁrst to the review of
twenty-ﬁve thousand naturalizations and then to the publication in the Journal
152 According to the amendment, naturalizations could now be revoked also when
“obtained . . . by concealment of material circumstances” or if “the person to whom
the certiﬁcate is granted has shown himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal
to His Majesty.”
153 Revocations concerned sixty-seven wives of British subjects of former enemy
alien origins and thirty-seven children. See TNA, HO 144/13377, “List of Persons whose
Certiﬁcates of Naturalization have been revoked . . . during the period 1st January, 1918
to 31st December, 1930.”
154 My calculations on PP, HC/ANR, 1919 (74); 1920 (95); 1921 (94); 1922 (116);
1923 (58); 1924 (92); 1924–25 (83); 1926 (88); 1927 (66); 1928 (75); 1928–29 (109).
155 Speyer became the target of a hate campaign from the beginning of the war. Even-
tually, the campaign led to his denaturalization in 1922. See PP, HC/ANR, 1922 [Cmd.
1569], Report made to the Secretary of State for the Home Department by the Certiﬁ-
cates of Naturalization (Revocation) Committee in the case of Sir Edgar Speyer (Lon-
don, 1922), and for a detailed analysis of the case, Lentin, Banker.
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Ofﬁciel of a list of the names and addresses of persons of enemy origins who
had been naturalized after January 1, 1913, thus making them vulnerable.156
Eventually, however, it led to the denaturalization of only 122 individuals; these
included persons on the list as well as individuals, mainly soldiers of the Foreign
Legion, who had ﬂed French territory (or who had changed their address and
were untraceable) to avoid conscription (30 out of 122).157 The numbers were
not high, but the principle of denaturalization and the idea that dangerousness
and ethnic origin went together had crept into French legislation after a debate
completely dominated by spy fever, internal security concerns, double alle-
giance, and fear and hatred of German economic hegemony.
In contrast to the British case, the French law on denaturalization was intended
as a defensive war measure, but its effects would last well beyond the exceptional
situation created by the conﬂict. It was a reaction to a German law on citizenship
passed in 1913 that had made it possible (surreptitiously, according to many) for
Germans to have dual citizenship. In light of the war, this provision could be in-
terpreted, on both shores of the Atlantic, as a German attempt to transform each
naturalized German into a potential spy.158 As the debate in the Assemblée Na-
tionale demonstrates,many thought that theGermanswho had applied for French
naturalization in the past had done so to prepare for the war, inﬁltrate France, and
strengthen German hegemony over the French economy. These convictions in-
duced French jurists, ofﬁcials, and members of parliament to maintain that France
had been too generous in granting citizenship in the past.159
The draft law presented at the opening of the National Assembly on Decem-
ber 22, 1914, by the ministers of justice, internal affairs, and colonies (Aristide
Briand, Louis Malvy, and Gaston Doumergue) had aimed at denaturalizing cit-
izens who “continue to consider themselves as subjects of their country of origin
156 “État nominative des naturalisations accordées depuis le 1er janvier 1913 à des
sujets ou anciens sujets de puissance en guerre avec la France,” Journal Ofﬁciel: Lois
et décrets (hereafter JO), May 7, 1915, 2926ff. The list included 758 names. The denat-
uralization decrees and amendments to the list were published in the following months
in the same journal.
157 According to the statistics of the Ministry of Justice: Les naturalisations, 41–43.
158 Richard W. Flournoy, “Observations on the New German Law of Nationality,”
American Journal of International Law 8, no. 3 (1914): 477–86; Jean Signorel, Le statut
des sujets ennemis: Le droit français pendant la guerre (Paris, 1916); Borchard, Diplo-
matic Protection; Alfred Weil, “Des ambiguités de la dénationalisation allemande,”
Journal du Droit International 43 (1916): 69–72; Clunet, “La nationalité et la guerre”;
Edmond Thaller, Esquisse de réforme de la législation des étrangers, particulièrement
dans les rapports franco-allemands, individus et sociétés (Paris, 1917); A. D. McNair,
Essays and Lectures upon Some Legal Effects of the War (Cambridge, 1920), 14–16.
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and act or could be led to act as such.”160 The presentation, along with other
drafts concerning the same issue, stirred up the anger and hatred of the MPs re-
gardless of their political allegiance. Indeed, during the debate in the Chamber
of Deputies, two distinct proposals, one presented by left-democratic deputy
Émile Constant, the other by Jules Delahaye, a member of the radical right-wing
and antisemitic movement l’Action Française, called for the denaturalization of
all French persons of enemy origin who had been granted naturalization after
1889.161 Some others demanded to strip aliens and all naturalized persons of en-
emy origin of their property.162 Others, such as Catholic deputies Joseph Denais
and Jean Lerolle, both members of Action Libérale, asked for a limit to be set on
the political rights of naturalized persons.163 Still others called for controls on all
aliens, fearing that enemies might enter France using a passport issued by a neu-
tral country. (Americans and Swiss were deemed particularly untrustworthy.)
Compared with these other laws proposed by FrenchMPs and with the debate
that took place in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, the bill on denat-
uralization, passed in April 1915, was more moderate, maintaining that natural-
ized persons of enemy origins were not part of a collective category. This merely
paid lip service to the liberal tradition, however, since the envisaged mechanism
entirely deprived denaturalized persons of judicial guarantee. Denaturalization
would be accomplished by an administrative act, and the burden of proof for
reversal would rest with the denaturalized individuals, who could appeal to the
Council of State but would have little chance of having their reasons heard. Al-
though Maurice Bernard, the main speaker for the government’s proposal, said
that the French parliament had adopted the measure with the aim of seizing as-
sets, not people, and that it was intended to give the government a new weapon
with which to defend the country against potential internal enemies, the outcome
of the lawwas to transform into enemies, and actually into stateless enemies, those
who were denaturalized, making possible their internment and the conﬁscation
of their property.
Among the victims of the ﬁrst wave of denaturalization in France was Joseph
Dreifuss, a leather merchant, who worked and lived in Paris. He was born in
“Germany” in 1862. By 1915, he had been living in Paris for thirty years.
His wife was French and, according to his declaration, he had no remaining ties
with Germany. In 1912 he applied to become a French citizen, and he succeeded,
but his new status was threatened and then overturned by the outbreak of the
First World War. After the French National Assembly had passed the denatural-
160 JO, Chambre de députés, Documents parlementaires, Séance du 22 décembre
1914, annexe no. 441, 2175.
161 Ibid., annexe no. 467, 2184 and annexe no. 471, 2185–86.
162 Ibid., annexe no. 468, 2184–85.
163 Ibid., annexe no. 472, 2186.
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ization law discussed above, Dreifuss was stripped of his French citizenship
with a simple administrative act and without any further explanation. He reacted
to what he considered an unexpected and unfair action by lodging an appeal with
the Conseil d’Etat, but it rejected his petition on July 7, 1916. With the same
judgment, the Conseil d’Etat also dismissed the claim of Michel (Max) Lévi,
a diamond merchant—also born in “Germany”—who had been living in Paris
for thirty-seven years. Like Dreifuss, he declared himself to be a decent and hon-
orable merchant, with no ties to Germany and sincerely attached to France. The
Conseil d’Etat, an institution called to guarantee the due process of law, stated
that deciding whom to denaturalize was a sovereign prerogative of the govern-
ment, which, according to the law, was not compelled to justify and explain its
decision.164 André Denné, a third petitioner, was actually born in France in 1844.
A son of a Bavarian, he had spent his entire life in France, had been married
twice, both times to a French woman, and had obtained his naturalization decree
on June 21, 1913. He had applied for naturalization to gain formal recognition of
a citizenship that he claimed to possess because hewas born in France. Although
in 1844 there was no jus soli in France, by the time of Denné’s petition in 1916
jus soli had not only become the standard way to acquire citizenship but was also
dominating the republican discourse on citizenship and belonging. His age and
his proclaimed “Frenchness” did not prevent him, and of course also his current
wife Madame Roblot, from being stripped of his naturalization.165 Only a few
denaturalized persons petitioned the Conseil d’Etat: Dreifuss, Lévi, and Denné,
and later Gustave-Nathan Mayer, Hermann Meyers, Robert Diem, and their re-
spective spouses, along with Ernest Frédéric Kopp—all but Denné bearing Jew-
ish surnames.166 They tried to follow the legal path to reverse the dire decisions
that had changed their lives, seeking to demonstrate that they had not maintained
German citizenship together with their French citizenship and that they could
not be charged and condemned for having dual nationality, but their arguments
were dismissed by the Conseil d’Etat.
As the war proceeded, the National Assembly continued to produce new
laws and decrees affecting citizenship. On June 18, 1917, a new law on denat-
uralization changed the process.167 The administrative procedure gave way to a
judicial one that was supposed to give more guarantees to the defendants, arous-
164 Recueil des arrêts du Conseil d’État statuant au contentieux, des décisions du
Tribunal des conﬂits et de la Cour des comptes (Paris, 1916), July 7, 1916, 86:277–
80. Germany is indicated in both cases as the country of birth even though a uniﬁed Ger-
many did not yet exist in 1859 and 1862.
165 Recueil des arrêts du Conseil d’État statuant au contentieux, des décisions du
Tribunal des conﬂits et de la Cour des comptes (Paris, 1917), July 27, 1917, 87:607–8.
166 Ibid., February 16, 1917, 87:170–71; June 10, 1921, 575; April 20, 1923, 354.
167 JO, June 20, 1917, 4731.
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ing the criticism of respected lawyers such as Maurice Hauriou, who was ex-
tremely annoyed by the “juridical misgivings” on enemy aliens after three years
of war.168 Since the review of the naturalizations granted after January 1, 1913,
had been completed and very few of those naturalized had been found guilty of
fraud, denaturalization remained possible only for those with dual (or alleged
dual) citizenship and those whom the judicial process found guilty of spying,
collaborating with the enemy, and so on, and the new judicial procedure was
used to denaturalize an additional 427 persons of German, Austro-Hungarian, or
Turkish origin. In total, 549 persons were thus denaturalized from 1915 to 1923.
Among them there were 473 males and 76 females: 413 Germans, 123 Austro-
Hungarians, 5 Turks, 1 Bulgarian, and 2 individuals of unknown nationality.169
And ﬁnally, a few weeks before the end of the conﬂict, the French parliament
reopened the discussion on denaturalization—this time to consider a proposal in-
tended, perhaps in response to Hauriou’s criticism, to facilitate and accelerate
denaturalization procedures.
The French denaturalization measures were welcomed as a signiﬁcant inno-
vation and a precedent to imitate, as Jules Valéry suggested: “These laws are a
very interesting legislative innovation. Their example should be followed. Every
country which is jealous of its independence and of the value of its nationality
as an honorable thing, should by law provide that not only in time of war, but also
in peace, naturalization might be withdrawn from any person whose acts should
be declared by the tribunal to be contrary to the sentiments which he afﬁrmed
when he changed his country, i.e., acts which prove that the change was not
a reality.”170
IV. Concluding Remarks
Once decided upon, the measures and provisions discussed above had to be im-
plemented. The need to enforce the regulations set in motion a mechanism that
involved ordinary bureaucracies and ofﬁces that were created ad hoc. Yet, the
capacity of the state to enforce these policies was continuously put to the test by
the war itself and by its political evolution—not least the revolution and the col-
lapse of the state in the Russian Empire, Germany, and Austria. Translation into
practice of laws, decrees, and regulations—and not only those on aliens and en-
emy aliens—met with various setbacks caused by the scarcity of ﬁnancial re-
168 Maurice Hauriou, Notes d’arrêts sur décisions du Conseil d’état et du Tribunal
des conﬂits publiées au Recueil Sirey de 1892 à 1928: Réunies et classées par André
Hauriou (Paris, 1929), 2:11–12.
169 Les naturalisations, 41–43.
170 J. Valery, “World War and Its Effect on Future Private International Law,” Har-
vard Law Review 31 (1918): 980–1010, 991.
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sources, rivalries within the civil bureaucracies, conﬂicts between the army and
the public administration, and the agency of the “victims.”171
As some of the cases I presented in this article show, aliens, enemy aliens, and
internal enemies responded to the persecutions, discriminations, and vexations
that they had to endure either by trying to evade or circumvent the regulations
or by implementing strategies of survival: they might leave and re-emigrate (when
feasible), enlist, appeal to the court, claim a different citizenship (that of a friendly
or a neutral country) or a stateless status, marry a national or divorce an enemy
national, or activate personal networks of relationships. These were some of the
strategies that people devised to evade regulations, to survive, and to reduce the
impact of the measures on their own lives and those of their families. A thorough
analysis of these strategies of evasion and survival would be beyond the scope of
this essay, but we may still draw some general conclusions.
What do the stories told in this article show? First, they indicate that citizenship
was far from being a stable attribute and that it was subject to contingency, not
only in multinational imperial formations but also in modern nation-states, and
notwithstanding the existence of many formal rules, codes, and jurisprudence.172
Citizenship, to quoteGeoff Eley, “remainedmarkedly under construction,”173 but
the war contributed to reducing the variety of juridical statuses and of emotional
and affective belongings, forcing them into a few clear-cut categories.
Second, these stories show that duringwartime, skepticism toward peoplewith
multiple or different identities (whether national, religious, linguistic, or ethnic)
increased dramatically. In particular, having origins or parentage that did not co-
incide with one’s nationality—a German origin and a French nationality, for in-
stance, or a French origin and a Swiss passport, as was the case of a number
of Swiss living in the Alsatian operation zone174—made people suspect; they
were considered untrustworthy and exposed to abuses and persecution.175 Na-
tional and local authorities were alert and ready to scrutinize not only foreigners
171 Thanks to David Feldman for drawing my attention to these issues.
172 On citizenship as contingent and contested practice, see Canning, “Reﬂections,”
216–18, and Geoff Eley, “Some General Thoughts on Citizenship in Germany,” in Cit-
izenship and National Identity, 233–46.
173 Eley, “General Thoughts,” 238.
174 The German government decided to expel the Swiss (therefore neutral) citizens of
French origin living in the Alsatian operation zone. A note of the German Foreign Ofﬁce
described them as “outwardly Swiss, but French within.” BAB, R901/82914, Decem-
ber 31, 1914, and R901/82915, April 2, 1915.
175 For an interesting discussion of mistrusted loyalty on both sides during the war, see
the case of Heligoland-born individuals in Jan Rüger, “Sovereignty and Empire in the
North Sea, 1807–1918,” American Historical Review 119, no. 2 (2014): 313–38. Mistrust
was directed at friendly aliens as well. See Laura Tabili, Global Migrants, Local Culture:
Natives and Newcomers in Provincial England, 1841–1939 (Basingstoke, 2011).
Subjects, Citizens, and Aliens during World War I 527
but also those who had voluntarily embraced a citizenship different from the
one they had acquired through birth or descent, or those who lived in legal limbo
because of the territorial changes that had taken place in the decades preceding
the war.
Moreover, empires showed an increasing tendency to think like nation-states
where citizenship was concerned. Above all, more than in the past, belligerent
states tended to link citizenship to nationality, whichmeant territorializing mem-
bership in a state (linking citizenship to a nation, to a territory, and to the speciﬁc
preeminent ethnic group) and making it contingent on ethnicity, religion, lan-
guage, or social class, as in postwar Russia. States at war were concerned in par-
ticular with the uniqueness of citizenship. National ambiguity, dual citizenship,
and allegiance to more than one state now became specters haunting many war-
ring countries, especially those that had experienced intense migration move-
ments. But solutions to the problem proved to be very different in different nations
and sometimes opposed to one another, as the French and the Ottoman cases
demonstrate. For French ofﬁcials, “defrenchifying” French subjects who hadGer-
man blood in their veins seemed the best thing to do. On the contrary, “Otto-
manizing” Russian Jews or preventing the departure of “American born children
of Syrian parentage”176 seemed the easiest way to avoid national disturbances
in the Ottoman Empire. Increasing, or at least not diminishing, the number of
Ottoman subjects outside Anatolia was probably also part of a desperate attempt
to preserve the empire, to maintain control over a territory and a population that
had been sharply reduced by the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 and that the cur-
rent war threatened to shrink even further.
Third, these stories also show that speaking of citizenship with the classic
distinction between jus soli and jus sanguinis in mind (the assimilationist model
vs. the ethnic model) does not aid the understanding of either the meaning of cit-
izenship or the behavior of governments, parliaments, local authorities, and ar-
mies. Having the same blood, even in a country known for basing its citizenship
law mainly on a jus sanguinis principle, did not automatically transform a per-
son into a citizen. Elise and Josephine Rüssel were the two natural daughters of a
male German citizen and a Cambodian woman. In February 1920, after having
been interned as enemy aliens in a concentration camp in Phnom-Penh for ﬁve
years and having their property conﬁscated, they asked to be recognized as Ger-
man subjects. Rejecting their request, the German consul in Bangkok wrote that
“the German father does not transfer his German nationality to his natural chil-
176 National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD, RG 84, Dip-
lomatic posts—Turkey, 371, America Consulate General, Beirut Syria, February 8,
1915. The letter refers in particular to Gabriel Farah: “this poor man, who has a most
excellent record as a soldier for many years in the United States Army, is now detained
here, exhausting his slender resources, and rapidly becoming destitute.”
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dren but exclusively to those born in legitimate wedlock.”177 Yet having differ-
ent blood did not prevent the sons of a Russian Jew from obtaining citizenship
and enlisting in the German army, as in the example of Jakob Borg mentioned
above. In contrast, so-called assimilationist-model countries proved to be more
nation- or ethnicity-driven in wartime than they were during peacetime. Being
born on the territory of countries that relied on a jus soli system, such as Britain
or France, did not protect people from discrimination, as in the cases of the many
British spouses of German men who lost their original nationality upon mar-
riage, or in the above-mentioned case of André Denné, who, although born in
France before the introduction of the jus soli, tried to use that principle to reverse
his fate.
Fourth, the stories show that citizenship was ﬂuid, especially at a time when
systems of personal identiﬁcation were not particularly sophisticated, and not
only states but also individuals could play with nationality by claiming to have
different identities when it suited their interests. Last but not least, they show
that, even though women had a derivative citizenship that could transform them
into enemies or friends according to the citizenship of their husband (again as in
the case of British-born women cited above), their origins and original citizen-
ship could be used to strengthen and legitimize nationality and loyalty claims:
In four out of ﬁve cases brought before the French Conseil d’Etat in the hope
of reversing a denaturalization decision, the wife’s nationality before marriage
was used to support the “Frenchness,” the loyalty, and the trustworthiness of the
petitioners, men who had only recently been naturalized despite long residence
in the country.
As a pillar of national sovereignty, citizenship played a critical role in the First
World War. At the same time, the war played a crucial role in the reshaping of
citizenship laws, concepts, and practices. It jeopardized the concept of citizen-
ship as an act of choice or as bound to a territory, while strengthening the notion
of citizenship as a community of descent rooted in loyalty and patriotism. But
above all it equated the member/nonmember opposition with the friend/enemy
opposition. The logic of the state at war and of the nation in arms trumped any
argument in favor of dual citizenship, multiple belonging and identity, bi- and
multilingualism, and so on, not only in nations but also in empires that the war
made think and behave like nation-states.
Citizens as well as foreigners could be recast as dangerous internal enemies
because of their origins or their ties to an enemy country. Origins, loyalty, sense
of belonging, and patriotism tended to annul or override legal requirements such
as residence or birth. The war precipitated the need to make citizenship coincide
with nationally compact populations living within well-deﬁned and protected
177 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes—Berlin, R52226.
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borders. But in addition, with its triumphant nationalism, the war imposed the
idea that origins and citizenship should be consistent. It also created the sense
that membership in a state ought to be exclusive—an idea that governments,
parliaments, and jurists felt was threatened by the 1913 German Law that envis-
aged the possibility of a double citizenship. Consistency of origins and citizen-
ship and exclusiveness of membership challenged assimilationist models of the
state and the republican founding myth, made countries move away from univer-
salistic approaches to citizenship, and transformed foreign-born citizens into
aliens, notwithstanding their naturalization. Moreover, the war jeopardized the
procedural guarantees that differentiated liberal democracies from authoritar-
ian systems.
In addition, in matters of citizenship the war did not end in 1918. The peace
treaties in central and eastern Europe, the concatenation of war and revolution
and civil war in the former Russian Empire, and the war between Greece and
Turkey produced new tensions and crises over borders and populations that cre-
ated the basis for new citizenship claims, new refugee crises, and a severe in-
crease in statelessness.
The legacy of the war and of the revolutions it nurturedwas, therefore, long last-
ing and twofold. On the one hand, it accelerated processes of ethnicization, which
were already under way.178 The end of the state of emergency did not restore pre-
war constitutional order, and peace treaties afﬁrming national self-determination
and regulating citizenship options legitimated the ethnolinguistic turn. On the
other hand, as in the Soviet Union, the war and the revolution introduced new
“identity”markers, such as class- and social-based discrimination, soon to be ac-
companied by ethnic-based security and political concerns.179 Ethnicity, class, state
security, and ideology thus helped population policies reach tragic new frontiers
in the interwar years.
178 See also Gammerl, Staatsbürger, 333.
179 Terry Martin, “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,” Journal of Modern His-
tory 70, no. 4 (1998): 813–61.
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